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Abstract. We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in con-
current games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the
existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while
the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is decidable, even if we put
a constraint on the payoff of the equilibrium. Our undecidability result holds even
for a restricted class of concurrent games, where nonzero rewards occur only on
terminal states. Moreover, we show that the constrained existence problem is un-
decidable not only for concurrent games but for turn-based games with the same
restriction on rewards. Finally, we prove that the constrained existence problem
for Nash equilibria in (pure or randomised) stationary strategies is decidable and
analyse its complexity.
1 Introduction
Concurrent games provide a versatile model for the interaction of several com-
ponents in a distributed system where the components perform actions in
parallel [17]. Classically, such a system is modelled by a family of concurrent
two-player games, one for each component, where one component tries to fulfil
its specification against the coalition of all other components. In practice, this
modelling is often too pessimistic because it ignores the specifications of the
other components. We argue that a distributed system is more faithfully mod-
elled by a multiplayer game where each player has her own objective, which is
independent of the other players’ objectives.
Another objection to the classical theory of verification and synthesis has
been that specifications are qualitative: either the specification is fulfilled, or
it is violated. Examples of such specifications include reachability properties,
∗ This work was supported by ESF RNP “Games for Design and Verification” (GAMES), the
French project ANR-06-SETI-003 (DOTS) and EPSRC grant EP/G050112/1.
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where a certain set of target states has to be reached, or safety properties, where
a certain set of states has to be avoided. In practice, many specifications are
of a quantitative nature, examples of which include minimising average power
consumption or maximising average throughput. Specifications of the latter
kind can be expressed by assigning (positive or negative) rewards to states or
transitions and considering the limit-average reward gained from an infinite play.
In fact, concurrent games where a player’s payoff is defined in such a way have
been a central topic in game theory (see the related work section below).
The most common solution concept for games with multiple players is that
of a Nash equilibrium [20]. In a Nash equilibrium, no player can improve her
payoff by changing her strategy unilaterally. Unfortunately, Nash equilibria do
not always exist in concurrent games, and if they exist, they may not be unique.
In applications, one might look for an equilibrium where some players receive a
high payoff while other players receive a low payoff. Formulated as a decision
problem, given a game with k players and thresholds x, y ∈ (Q ∪ {±∞})k,
we want to know whether the game has a Nash equilibrium whose payoff lies
in-between x and y; we call this decision problem NE.
The problem NE comes in several variants, depending on the type of strategies
one considers: On the one hand, strategies may be randomised (allowing random-
isation over actions) or pure (not allowing such randomisation). On the other
hand, one can restrict to strategies that use finite memory or even to stationary
strategies, which only depend on the last state. Indeed, we show that these
restrictions give rise to distinct decision problems, which have to be analysed
separately.
Our results show that the complexity of NE highly depends on the type of
strategies that realise the equilibrium. In particular, we prove the following
results, which yield an almost complete picture of the complexity of NE:
1. NE for pure stationary strategies (or pure strategies with bounded memory)
is NP-complete.
2. NE for stationary strategies (or randomised strategies with bounded memory)
is decidable in Pspace, but hard for both NP and SqrtSum.
3. NE for arbitrary pure strategies is NP-complete.
4. NE for arbitrary randomised strategies is undecidable.
All of our lower bounds for NE and, in particular, our undecidability result
hold already for a subclass of concurrent games where Nash equilibria are
guaranteed to exist, namely for turn-based games. If this assumption is relaxed
and Nash equilibria are not guaranteed to exist, we prove that even the plain
existence problem for Nash equilibria is undecidable. Moreover, many of our
lower bounds hold already for games where non-zero rewards only occur on
terminal states, and thus also for games where each player wants to maximise
the total sum of the rewards.
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As a byproduct of our decidability proof for pure strategies, we give a
polynomial-time algorithm for deciding whether in a multi-weighted graph
there exists a path whose limit-average weight vector lies between two given
thresholds, a result that is of independent interest. For instance, our algorithm
can be used for deciding the emptiness of a multi-threshold mean-payoff language [2]
in polynomial time.
related work. Concurrent and, more generally, stochastic games go back
to Shapley [24], who proved the existence of the value for discounted two-player
zero-sum games. This result was later generalised by Fink [13] who proved
that every discounted game has a Nash equilibrium. Gillette [16] introduced
limit-average objectives, and Mertens & Neyman [19] proved the existence of the
value for stochastic two-player zero-sum games with limit-average objectives.
Unfortunately, as demonstrated by Everett [12], these games do, in general, not
admit a Nash equilibrium (see Example 1). However, Vielle [29, 30] proved
that, for all ε > 0, every two-player stochastic limit-average game admits an
ε-equilibrium, i.e. a pair of strategies where each player can gain at most ε from
switching her strategy. Whether such equilibria always exist in games with more
than two players is an important open question [21].
Determining the complexity of Nash equilibria has attracted much interest
in recent years. In particular, a series of papers culminated in the result that
computing a Nash equilibrium of a finite two-player game in strategic form is
complete for the complexity class PPAD [6, 8]. The constrained existence problem,
where one looks for a Nash equilibrium with certain properties, has also been
investigated for games in strategic form. In particular, Conitzer & Sandholm [7]
showed that deciding whether there exists a Nash equilibrium whose payoff
exceeds a given threshold and related decision problems are NP-complete for
two-player games in strategic form.
For concurrent games with limit-average objectives, most algorithmic results
concern two-player zero-sum games. In the turn-based case, these games are
commonly known as mean-payoff games [10, 32]. While it is known that the value
of such a game can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time, it is still open
whether there exists a polynomial-time algorithm for solving mean-payoff games.
A related model are multi-dimensional mean-payoff games where one player tries
to maximise several mean-payoff conditions at the same time [5]. In particular,
Velner & Rabinovich [28] showed that the value problem for these games is
coNP-complete.
One subclass of concurrent games with limit-average objectives that has
been studied in the multiplayer setting are concurrent games with reachability
objectives. In particular, Bouyer et al. [3] showed that the constrained existence
problem for Nash equilibria is NP-complete for these games (see also [26, 14]).
We extend their result to limit-average objectives. However, we assume that
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strategies can observe actions (a common assumption in game theory), which
they do not. Hence, while our result is more general w.r.t. the type of objectives
we consider, their result is more general w.r.t. the type of strategies they allow.
In a recent paper [27], we studied the complexity of Nash equilibria in
stochastic games with reachability objectives. In particular, we proved that NE
for pure strategies is undecidable in this setting. Since we prove here that this
problem is decidable in the non-stochastic setting, this undecidability result can
be explained by the presence of probabilistic transitions in stochastic games.
On the other hand, we prove in this paper that randomisation in strategies also
leads to undecidability, a question that was left open in [27].
2 Concurrent Games
Concurrent games are played by finitely many players on a finite state space.
Formally, a concurrent game is given by
– a finite nonempty set Π of players, e.g. Π = {0, 1, . . . , k− 1},
– a finite nonempty set S of states,
– for each player i and each state s a nonempty set Γi(s) of actions taken from a
finite set Γ,
– a transition function δ : S× ΓΠ → S,
– for each player i ∈ Π a reward function ri : S → R.
For computational purposes, we assume that all rewards are rational numbers
with numerator and denominator given in binary. We say that an action profile
a = (ai)i∈Π is legal at state s if ai ∈ Γi(s) for each i ∈ Π. Finally, we call a
state s controlled by player i if |Γj(s)| = 1 for all j ̸= i, and we say that a game
is turn-based if each state is controlled by (at least) one player. For turn-based
games, an action of the controlling player prescribes to go to a certain state.
Hence, we will usually omit actions in turn-based games.
For a tuple x = (xi)i∈Π , where the elements xi belong to an arbitrary set X,
and an element x ∈ X, we denote by x−i the restriction of x to Π \ {i} and by
(x−i, x) the unique tuple y ∈ XΠ with yi = x and y−i = x−i.
A play of a game G is an infinite sequence s0a0s1a1 . . . ∈ (S · ΓΠ)ω such that
δ(sj, aj) = sj+1 for all j ∈ N. For each player, a play π = s0a0s1a1 . . . gives rise
to an infinite sequence of rewards. There are different criteria to evaluate this
sequence and map it to a payoff. In this paper, we consider the limit-average
(or mean-payoff ) criterion, where the payoff of π for player i is defined by
φi(π) := lim infn→∞
1
n
n−1
∑
j=0
ri(sj).
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Note that this payoff mapping is prefix-independent, i.e. φi(π) = φi(π′) if π′ is a
suffix of π. An important special case are games where non-zero rewards occur
only on terminal states, i.e. states s with δ(s, a) = s for all (legal) a ∈ ΓΠ . These
games were introduced by Everett [12] under the name recursive games, but we
prefer to call them terminal-reward games. Hence, in a terminal-reward game,
φi(π) = ri(s) if π enters a terminal state s and φi(π) = 0 otherwise.
Often, it is convenient to designate an initial state. An initialised game is thus
a tuple (G, s0) where G is a concurrent game and s0 is one of its states.
strategies and strategy profiles. For a finite set X, we denote by D(X) the
set of probability distributions over X. A (randomised) strategy for player i
in G is a mapping σ : (S · ΓΠ)∗ · S → D(Γ) assigning to each possible his-
tory xs ∈ (S · ΓΠ)∗ · S a probability distribution σ(xs) over actions such that
σ(xs)(a) > 0 only if a ∈ Γi(s). We write σ(a | xs) for the probability assigned
to a ∈ Γ by the distribution σ(xs). A (randomised) strategy profile of G is a tuple
σ = (σi)i∈Π of strategies in G, one for each player. Note that a strategy profile
can be identified with a function σ : (S · ΓΠ)∗ · S → D(Γ)Π .
A strategy σ for player i is called pure if for each xs ∈ (S · ΓΠ)∗ · S the
distribution σ(xs) is degenerate, i.e. there exists a ∈ Γi(s) with σ(a | xs) = 1. Note
that a pure strategy can be identified with a function σ : (S · ΓΠ)∗ · S → Γ. A
strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈Π is called pure if each σi is pure, in which case we can
identify σ with a mapping (S · ΓΠ)∗ · S → ΓΠ . Note that, given an initial state s0
and a pure strategy profile σ, there exists a unique play π = s0a0s1a1 . . . such
that σ(s0a0 . . . aj−1sj) = aj for all j ∈N; we call π the play induced by σ from s0.
A memory structure for G is a tripleM = (M, δ, m0), where M is a set of memory
states, δ : M×S× ΓΠ → M is the update function, and m0 ∈ M is the initial memory.
A (randomised) strategy with memory M for player i is a function σ : M × S →
D(Γ) such that σ(m, s)(a) > 0 only if a ∈ Γi(s). The strategy σ is pure if the
distribution σ(m, s) is degenerate for all m ∈ M and s ∈ S. A (pure) strategy σ
with memory M can be viewed as a (pure) strategy σ′ in the usual sense by
setting σ′(xs) = σ(δ∗(x), s), where δ∗(x) is defined inductively by δ∗(ε) = m0
and δ∗(x · sa) = δ(δ∗(x), s, a). A finite-state strategy is a strategy σ with finite
memory M. If the memory M is a singleton, we call σ stationary. Moreover, we
call a strategy positional if it is both pure and stationary. A stationary strategy
can thus be represented by a mapping σ : S → D(Γ), and a positional strategy
by a mapping σ : S → Γ. Finally, we call a strategy profile finite-state, stationary
or positional if each strategy in the profile has the respective property.
the probability measure induced by a strategy profile. Given an initial
state s0 ∈ S and a strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈Π, the conditional probability of
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a ∈ ΓΠ given the history xs ∈ (S · ΓΠ)∗ · S equals
σ(a | xs) := ∏
i∈Π
σi(ai | xs).
The probabilities σ(a | xs) induce a probability measure on the Borel σ-algebra
over (S · ΓΠ)ω as follows: The probability of a basic open set s1a1 . . . snan ·
(S · ΓΠ)ω equals the product ∏nj=1 σ(aj | s1a1 . . . aj−1sj) if s1 = s0 and δ(sj, aj) =
sj+1 for all 1 ≤ j < n; in all other cases, this probability is 0. By Carathéodory’s
extension theorem, this extends to a unique probability measure assigning a
probability to every Borel subset of (S · ΓΠ)ω, which we denote by Prσs0 . Via
the natural projection (S · ΓΠ)ω → Sω, we obtain a probability measure on the
Borel σ-algebra over Sω . We abuse notation and denote this measure also by Prσs0 ;
it should always be clear from the context to which measure we are referring to.
Finally, we denote by Eσs0 the expectation operator that corresponds to Pr
σ
s0 , i.e.
Eσs0( f ) =
∫
f dPrσs0 for all Borel measurable functions f : (S · ΓΠ)
ω → R∪ {±∞}
or f : Sω → R ∪ {±∞}. In particular, we are interested in the quantities pi :=
Eσs0(φi). We call pi the (expected) payoff of σ for player i and the vector (pi)i∈Π
the (expected) payoff of σ. Finally, we call a history x ∈ (S · ΓΠ)∗ · S consistent
with σ if Prσs0(x · (S · ΓΠ)
ω
) > 0.
In order to apply known results about Markov chains, we can also view
the stochastic process induced by a strategy profile σ as a countable Markov
chain Gσ, defined as follows: The set of states of Gσ equals the set (S · ΓΠ)∗ · S
of histories of G. The only transitions from a state xs lead to states of the form
xsat where t = δ(s, a), and such a transition occurs with probability σ(a | xs).
For each player i, the Markov decision process Gσ−i has the same states as Gσ,
and there is a transition from a state xs to a state xsat with action a ∈ Γi(s) and
probability p if ai = a, δ(s, a) = t and p = ∏j ̸=i σj(aj). Finally, the reward of a
state xs in Gσ−i equals the reward ri(s) of the state s for player i in G.
If σ is a strategy profile with finite memoryM, we make Gσ and Gσ−i finite by
quotienting the state space w.r.t. the equivalence relation ∼, defined by xs ∼ yt
if s = t and δ∗(x) = δ∗(y). In particular, if σ is stationary, then the state spaces
of Gσ and Gσ−i coincide with the state space of G.
drawing concurrent games. When drawing a concurrent game as a graph,
we will adhere to the following conventions: States are usually depicted as
circles, but terminal states are depicted as squares. The initial state is marked by
a dangling incoming edge. An edge from s to t with label a means that δ(s, a) = t
and that a is legal at s. However, the label a might be omitted if it is not essential.
In turn-based games, the player who controls a state is indicated by the label
next to it. Finally, a label of the form i : x next to state s indicates that ri(s) = x;
if this reward is 0, the label will usually be omitted.
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s1
1 : 1
2 : − 1
1 : − 1
2 : 1
(a, b)
(b, a)(b, b)
(a, a)
Figure 1. A terminal-reward game that
has no Nash equilibrium.
s1
2 : 1 1 : 12 : 1
(a, b)
(b, a)(b, b)
(a, a)
Figure 2. A limit-average game that has
no Nash equilibrium.
3 Nash Equilibria
To capture rational behaviour of selfish players, Nash [20] introduced the notion
of — what is now called — a Nash equilibrium. Formally, given a game G and an
initial state s0, a strategy τ for player i is a best response to a strategy profile σ if
τ maximises the expected payoff for player i, i.e.
Eσ−i ,τ
′
s0 (φi) ≤ Eσ−i ,τs0 (φi)
for all strategies τ′ for player i. A strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈Π is a Nash equilibrium
of (G, s0) if for each player i the strategy σi is a best response to σ. Hence, in a
Nash equilibrium no player can improve her payoff by (unilaterally) switching
to a different strategy. As the following examples demonstrate, Nash equilibria
are not guaranteed to exist in concurrent games.
Example 1. Consider the terminal-reward game G1 depicted in Figure 1 and
played by players 1 and 2, which was originally presented in [9]. We claim that
(G1, s1) does not have a Nash equilibrium. First note that, for each ε > 0, player 1
can ensure a payoff of 1− 2ε by the stationary strategy that selects action b with
probability ε. Hence, every Nash equilibrium (σ, τ) of (G1, s1) must have payoff
(1,−1). Now we distinguish whether σ(b | (s1(a, a))ks1) = 0 for all k ∈ N or
not. In the first case, there must exist k ∈ N such that τ(b | (s1(a, a))ks1) > 0
(otherwise (σ, τ) would not have payoff (1,−1)). But then Player 2 can improve
her payoff by always playing action a with probability 1, a contradiction to
(σ, τ) being a Nash equilibrium. In the second case, consider the least k such
that p := σ(b | (s1(a, a))ks1) > 0. By choosing action b with probability 1 for
the history (s1(a, a))ks1 and choosing action a with probability 1 for all other
histories, player 2 can ensure payoff p, again a contradiction to (σ, τ) being a
Nash equilibrium.
Example 2. A variation of the previous game is the game G2, which is depicted
in Figure 2 and also played by players 1 and 2. It is not a terminal-reward game,
but the only rewards that occur in the game are 0 and 1. Using almost the
same argumentation as in Example 1, we can show that (G2, s1) has no Nash
equilibrium either.
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s0
1
s1
2
s2
0
0 : 1
1 : 2
0 : 1
2 : 2
1 : 1 2 : 1
Figure 3. A game with no pure Nash equilib-
rium where player 0 wins with positive prob-
ability.
s0
1
s1
2
0 : 1
1 : 1 s2
0
2 : 1
Figure 4. A game with no station-
ary Nash equilibrium where player 0
wins with positive probability.
It follows from Nash’s theorem [20] that every game whose arena is a tree
(or a DAG) has a Nash equilibrium. Another important special case of concurrent
limit-average games where Nash equilibria always exist are turn-based games.
For these games, Thuijsman & Raghavan [25] proved not only the existence of
arbitrary Nash equilibria but of pure finite-state ones.
To measure the complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games, we intro-
duce the following decision problem, which we call NE:
Given a game G, a state s0 and thresholds x, y ∈ (Q ∪ {±∞})Π, decide
whether (G, s0) has a Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y.
Note that we have not put any restriction on the type of strategies that realise the
equilibrium. It is natural to restrict the search space to profiles of pure, stationary
or positional strategies. These restrictions give rise to different decision problems,
which we call PureNE, StatNE and PosNE, respectively.
Before we analyse the complexity of these problems, let us convince ourselves
that these problems are not just different faces of the same coin. We first show
that the decision problems where we look for equilibria in randomised strategies
are distinct from the ones where we look for equilibria in pure strategies.
Proposition 3. There exists a turn-based terminal-reward game that has a sta-
tionary Nash equilibrium where player 0 receives payoff 1 but that has no pure
Nash equilibrium where player 0 receives payoff > 0.
Proof. Consider the game depicted in Figure 3 and played by three players 0, 1
and 2. Clearly, the stationary strategy profile where at state s2 player 0 selects
both outgoing transitions with probability 12 each, player 1 plays from s0 to s1 and
player 2 plays from s1 to s2 is a Nash equilibrium where player 0 receives payoff 1.
However, in any pure strategy profile where player 0 receives payoff > 0, either
player 1 or player 2 receives payoff 0 and could improve her payoff by switching
her strategy at s0 or s1, respectively. 
Now we show that it makes a difference whether we look for an equilibrium
in stationary strategies or not.
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Proposition 4. There exists a turn-based terminal-reward game that has a pure
Nash equilibrium where player 0 receives payoff 1 but that has no stationary
Nash equilibrium where player 0 receives payoff > 0.
Proof. Consider the game G depicted in Figure 4 and played by three players 0,
1 and 2. Clearly, the pure strategy profile that leads to the terminal state with
payoff 1 for player 0 and where player 0 plays “right” if player 1 has deviated
and “left” if player 2 has deviated is a Nash equilibrium of (G, s0) with payoff 1
for player 0. Now consider any stationary equilibrium of (G, s0) where player 0
receives payoff > 0. If the stationary strategy of player 0 prescribes to play “right”
with positive probability, then player 2 can improve her payoff by playing to s2
with probability 1, and otherwise player 1 can improve her payoff by playing
to s2 with probability 1, a contradiction. 
It follows from Section 3 that NE and StatNE are different from PureNE and
PosNE, and it follows from Proposition 4 that NE and PureNE are different from
StatNE and PosNE. Hence, all of these decision problems are pairwise distinct,
and their decidability and complexity has to be studied separately.
4 Positional Strategies
In this section, we show that the problem PosNE is NP-complete; we start by
proving the upper bound.
Theorem 5. PosNE is in NP.
Proof. To decide PosNE on input G, s0, x, y, we start by guessing a positional
strategy profile σ of G, i.e. mappings σi : S → Γ such that σi(s) ∈ Γi(s) for all
i ∈ Π and s ∈ S. Then, we verify whether σ is a Nash equilibrium with the
desired payoff. To do this, we first compute the payoff zi of σ for each player i
by computing the number Eσs0(φi) in the finite Markov chain Gσ. Since Gσ is
deterministic, this number equals the average weight (for player i) on the unique
simple cycle reachable from s0 and can thus be computed in polynomial time.
Once each zi is computed, we can easily check whether xi ≤ zi ≤ yi. To verify
that σ is a Nash equilibrium, we additionally compute, for each player i, the
value vi of the finite MDP Gσ−i from s0. This number can be computed by
identifying the highest average weight (for player i) on a simple cycle reachable
in Gσ−i from s0, which can also be done in polynomial time [18]. Clearly, σ is a
Nash equilibrium if and only if vi ≤ zi for each player i. 
A result by Chatterjee et al. [5, Lemma 15] implies that PosNE is NP-hard,
even for turn-based games with rewards taken from {−1, 0, 1} (but with an
unbounded number of players). We strengthen their result by showing that the
problem remains NP-hard if there are only three players and rewards are taken
from {0, 1}.
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Theorem 6. PosNE is NP-hard, even for turn-based three-player games with
rewards 0 and 1.
Proof. We reduce from the Hamiltonian cycle problem. Given a graph G = (V, E),
we define a turn-based three-player game G as follows: the set of states is V,
all states are controlled by player 0, and the transition function corresponds
to E (i.e. Γ0(v) = vE and δ(v, a) = w if and only if a0 = w). Let n = |V| and
v0 ∈ V. Player 0 receives reward 1 in each state. The reward of state v0 to
player 1 equals 1; all other states have reward 0 for player 1. Finally, player 2
receives reward 0 at v0 and reward 1 at all other states. We show that there is a
Hamiltonian cycle in G if and only if (G, v0) has a positional Nash equilibrium
with payoff ≥ (1, 1/n, (n− 1)/n).
(⇒) Let π = π(0)π(1) . . .π(n) be a Hamiltonian cycle that starts (and ends)
in π(0) = v0 = π(n). Consider the positional strategy σ of player 0 that plays
from π(i) to π(i + 1) for all i < n. The induced play from v0 is the play
(π(0)π(1) . . .π(n− 1))ω , which gives payoff 1 to player 0, payoff 1/n to player 1
and payoff (n− 1)/n to player 2. Moreover, it is obvious that we have a Nash
equilibrium.
(⇐) Let π be the play induced by a positional Nash equilibrium of (G, v0)
with payoff ≥ (1, 1/n, (n− 1)/n). Since π corresponds to a positional strategy
profile and gives player 1 a positive payoff, π has the form π = (v0v1 . . . vi−1)ω,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n and v0 . . . vi−1v0 is a simple cycle of G. Hence, the payoff of π
for player 2 equals (i− 1)/i. This number is greater than (n− 1)/n only if i ≥ n.
Hence, i = n and v0 . . . vi−1v0 is a Hamiltonian cycle. 
By combining our reduction with a game that has no positional Nash equilib-
rium, we can prove the following stronger result for non-turn-based games.
Corollary 7. Deciding the existence of a positional Nash equilibrium in a con-
current limit-average game is NP-complete, even for three-player games with
rewards 0 and 1.
Proof. Membership in NP follows from Theorem 5. To prove hardness, we reduce
from the following problem, whose NP-hardness follows from the proof of
Theorem 6: Given a three-player game (G, s0) with rewards 0 and 1 and n ∈N
(given in unary), decide whether (G, s0) has a positional Nash equilibrium with
payoff ≥ (1, 1/n, (n − 1)/n). From G, we construct a new game G ′, which
employs the game G2 from Example 2 and is depicted in Figure 5; we set the
reward for player 0 in all states of G2 to 1. Note that we can simulate the
fractional rewards in the terminal state by a cycle of n states with rewards 0
and 1. We claim that (G ′, s′0) has a positional Nash equilibrium if and only if
(G, s0) has a positional Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ (1, 1/n, (n− 1)/n).
(⇒) Let σ be a positional Nash equilibrium of (G ′, s′0). Since (G2, s1) does
not have a Nash equilibrium, the induced play must either enter the game G
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s′0 s′1
0 : 0
1 : 1/n
2 : (n− 1)/n
(G2, s1) (G, s0)
(a, a, a)
(b, a, a)
(a, b, a)
(a, a, b)
(a, b, b)
(a, a, a)
Figure 5. The game G ′.
or end at the terminal state with payoff 0 for player 0. But the latter case is
impossible since then player 0 could improve her payoff by playing action b at s′0.
Hence, the induced play enters G, and σ is also a Nash equilibrium of (G, s0).
Moreover, σ must have payoff at least (1, 1/n, (n− 1)/n) since otherwise player 1
or player 2 could improve her payoff by playing action b at s′1.
(⇐) Let σ be a positional Nash equilibrium of (G, s0) with payoff at least
(1, 1/n, (n− 1)/n). We can extend σ to a positional Nash equilibrium of (G ′, s′0)
by setting σ(s′0) = σ(s′0(a, a, a)s′1) = (a, a, a). 
5 Stationary Strategies
To prove the decidability of StatNE, we appeal to results established for the
existential theory of the reals, the set of all existential first-order sentences (over the
appropriate signature) that hold in the ordered field R := (R,+, ·, 0, 1,≤). The
best known upper bound for the complexity of the associated decision problem
is Pspace [4], which leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 8. StatNE is in Pspace.
Proof. To prove membership in Pspace, we show that there is a polynomial-time
procedure that on input G, s0, x, y returns an existential first-order sentence ψ
such that (G, s0) has a stationary Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y if
and only if ψ holds in R. How does ψ look like? Let α = (αis,a)i∈Π,s∈S,a∈Γ, v =
(vis)i∈Π,s∈S, b = (bs)s∈S and z = (zis)i∈Π,s∈S be four sets of variables. The formula
ϕi(α) :=
∧
s∈S
(
∑
a∈Γ
αis,a = 1∧
∧
a∈Γi(s)
αis,a ≥ 0∧
∧
a∈Γ\Γi(s)
αis,a = 0
)
states that the mapping σi : S → RΓ, defined by σi(s) : a 7→ αis,a is indeed a
stationary strategy for player i. Provided that each ϕi(α) holds in R, the formula
ηi(α, z) := ∃b
( ∧
s∈S
bs + zis = ri(s) + ∑
a∈ΓΠ
bδ(s,a) ·∏
j∈Π
α
j
s,aj
)
∧
∧
s∈S
zis = ∑
a∈ΓΠ
ziδ(s,a) ·∏
j∈Π
α
j
s,aj
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states that zis = E
σ
s (φi) for all s ∈ S, where σ = (σi)i∈Π (see [22, Theorem 8.2.6]).
Finally, the formula
ϑi(α, v) := ∃b
( ∧
s∈S
∧
a∈Γ
bs + vis ≥ ri(s) + ∑
a∈ΓΠ
ai=a
bδ(s,a) ·∏
j ̸=i
α
j
s,aj
)
∧
∧
s∈S
∧
a∈Γ
vis ≥ ∑
a∈ΓΠ
ai=a
viδ(s,a) ·∏
j ̸=i
α
j
s,aj
states that v is a solution of the linear programme for computing the values of
the MDP Gσ−i (see [22, Section 9.3]), i.e. the formula is fulfilled if and only if
vis ≥ supτ Eσ−i ,τs (φi) for all i ∈ Π and s ∈ S.
The desired sentence ψ is the existential closure of the conjunction of the
formulae ϕi, ηi and ϑi combined with formulae stating that player i cannot
improve her payoff and that the expected payoff for player i lies in-between the
given thresholds:
ψ := ∃α ∃v ∃z ∧
i∈Π
(ϕi(α) ∧ ηi(α, z) ∧ ϑi(α, v) ∧ vis0 ≤ zis0 ∧ xi ≤ zis0 ≤ yi) .
Clearly, ψ can be constructed in polynomial time from G, s0, x and y. Moreover,
ψ holds in R if and only if (G, s0) has a stationary Nash equilibrium with payoff
at least x and at most y. 
The next theorem shows that StatNE is NP-hard, even for turn-based games
with rewards 0 and 1. Note that this does not follow from the NP-hardness of
PosNE, but requires a different proof.
Theorem 9. StatNE is NP-hard, even for turn-based games with rewards 0 and 1.
Proof. We employ a reduction from SAT, which resembles a reduction in [26].
Given a Boolean formula ϕ = C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Cm in conjunctive normal form over
propositional variables X1, . . . , Xn, where w.l.o.g. m ≥ 1 and each clause is
nonempty, we build a turn-based game G played by players 0, 1, . . . , n as follows:
The game G has states C1, . . . , Cm controlled by player 0 and for each clause C
and each literal L that occurs in C a state (C, L), controlled by player i if L = Xi or
L = ¬Xi; additionally, the game contains a terminal state ⊥. There are transitions
from a clause Cj to each state (Cj, L) such that L occurs in Cj and from there
to C(j mod m)+1, and there is a transition from each state of the form (C,¬X)
to ⊥. Each state except ⊥ has reward 1 for player 0, whereas ⊥ has reward 0 for
player 0. For player i, all states except states of the form (C, Xi) have reward 1;
states of the form (C, Xi) have reward 0. The structure of G is depicted in
Figure 6.
Clearly, G can be constructed from ϕ in polynomial time. In order to establish
our reduction, we prove that the following statements are equivalent:
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Figure 6. Reducing SAT to StatNE.
1. ϕ is satisfiable.
2. (G, C1) has a positional Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ 1 for player 0.
3. (G, C1) has a stationary Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ 1 for player 0.
(1.⇒ 2.) Assume that α : {X1, . . . , Xn} → {true, false} is a satisfying assign-
ment for ϕ. We show that the positional strategy profile σ where at any time
player 0 plays from a clause C to a fixed state (C, L) such that L is mapped to
true by α and each player i ̸= 0 never plays to ⊥ is a Nash equilibrium of (G, C1)
with payoff 1 for player 0. First note that the induced play never reaches ⊥.
Hence, player 0 receives payoff 1, which is the best payoff player 0 can get.
To show that σ is a Nash equilibrium, consider any player i ̸= 0 who receives
payoff < 1. Hence, a state of the form (C, Xi) is visited in the induced play.
However, as player 0 plays according to the satisfying assignment, no state of
the form (C′,¬Xi) is ever visited. Hence, player i cannot improve her payoff by
playing to ⊥.
(2.⇒ 3.) Trivial.
(3.⇒ 1.) Assume that (G, C1) has a stationary Nash equilibrium σ with payoff
≥ 1 for player 0. Hence, the terminal state ⊥ is reached with probability 0 in σ.
Consider the variable assignment α that maps Xi to true if and only if player i
receives payoff < 1 from σ; we claim that α satisfies the formula. Consider
any clause C. By the construction of G, there exists a literal L ∈ C such that
σ0((C, L) | C) > 0. If L = Xi, then EσC1(φi) < 1 and α maps Xi to true, thus
satisfying C. If L = ¬Xi, then player i must receive payoff 1 since otherwise
she could switch to the positional strategy τ that plays from (C, L) to ⊥; in the
strategy profile (σ−i, τ) the state ⊥ is visited with probability 1, which gives
payoff 1 to player i. Hence, α maps Xi to false and satisfies C. 
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By combining our reduction with the game from Example 1, we can prove
the following stronger result for concurrent games.
Corollary 10. Deciding the existence of a stationary Nash equilibrium in a
concurrent limit-average game with rewards 0 and 1 is NP-hard.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Corollary 7. From a given concurrent
limit-average game (G, s0) with rewards 0 and 1, we construct a new game
(G ′, s′0) such that (G ′, s′0) has a stationary Nash equilibrium if and only if (G, s0)
has a stationary Nash equilibrium with payoff at least 1 for player 0. The game G ′
is the disjoint union of G, the game G2 from Example 2, and the state s′0, which is
controlled by player 0. At s′0 player 0 can either play to the initial state s0 of G or
to the initial state s1 of G2. Finally, we set the reward for player 0 in every state
of G2 to 1. 
So far we have shown that StatNE is contained in Pspace and hard for NP,
leaving a considerable gap between the two bounds. In order to gain a better
understanding of StatNE, we relate this problem to the square root sum problem
(SqrtSum), an important problem about numerical computations. Formally,
SqrtSum is the following decision problem: Given numbers d1, . . . , dn, k ∈ N,
decide whether ∑ni=1
√
di ≥ k. Recently, Allender et al. [1] showed that SqrtSum
belongs to the fourth level of the counting hierarchy, a slight improvement over the
previously known Pspace upper bound. However, it has been an open question
since the 1970s as to whether SqrtSum falls into the polynomial hierarchy [15, 11].
We give a polynomial-time reduction from SqrtSum to StatNE for turn-based
terminal-reward games. Hence, StatNE is at least as hard as SqrtSum, and
showing that StatNE resides inside the polynomial hierarchy would imply a
major breakthrough in understanding the complexity of numerical computations.
While our reduction is similar to the one in [27], it requires new techniques to
simulate stochastic states.
Theorem 11. SqrtSum is polynomial-time reducible to StatNE for turn-based
8-player terminal-reward games.
Before we state the reduction, let us first examine the game G(p), where
0 ≤ p ≤ 1, which is played by players 0, 1, . . . , 5 and depicted in Figure 7.
Lemma 12. The maximal payoff player 1 receives in a stationary Nash equilib-
rium of (G(p), s1) where player 0 receives payoff ≥ 0 equals √p.
Proof. Let σ be a stationary strategy profile of (G(p), s1) where player 0 receives
payoff ≥ 0, and let qi = σ0(vi | ui) be the probability that player 0 moves from
ui to vi. We claim that q := q1 = q2 = 1− p if σ is a Nash equilibrium. Let
z = Eσv1(φ4) and z
′ = Eσv1(φ5). Since σ is a Nash equilibrium, we have z ≥ 1− p
and z′ ≥ 1 (otherwise player 4 or player 5 would prefer to leave the game at r2
14
s1
2
0 : −1
2 : 1
r1
4
0 : −1
4 : 1
t1
5
0 : −1
5 : 1−p
u1
0

1 : 1
2 : 1
4 : 2−p
v1
0

2 : 2
4 : 1−p
5 : 1
s2 3
0 : −1
3 : 1
r2
4
0 : −1
4 : 1−p
t2
5
0 : −1
5 : 1
u2
0

1 : 1
3 : 1
5 : 2−p
v2
0

3 : 2
4 : 1
5 : 1−p
Figure 7. The game G(p).
or t2). On the other hand, since at every terminal state the sum of the rewards
for players 4 and 5 is at most 2− p, we have z + z′ ≤ 2− p. Hence, z = 1− p
and z′ = 1. Now consider the expected payoffs for players 4 and 5 from r1:
Eσr1(φ4) = (1− q1)(2− p) + q1 · z = 2− q1 − p;
Eσr1(φ5) = q1 · z′ = q1 .
Since σ is a Nash equilibrium, these numbers are bounded from below by 1
and 1− p, respectively (otherwise, player 4 or player 5 would leave the game at
r1 or t1). Hence, q1 = 1− p. The reasoning that q2 = 1− p is analogous.
In the following, assume without loss of generality that 0 < p < 1 (otherwise
the statement of the lemma is trivial). For any stationary strategy profile σ of G(p)
where player 0 receives payoff ≥ 0, let x1 = σ0(s2 | v1) and x2 = σ0(s1 | v2)
be the probabilities that player 0 does not leave the game at v1, respectively v2.
Given x1 and x2, for i = 1, 2 we can compute the payoff fi(x1, x2) := Eσsi (φi+1)
for player i + 1 from si by
fi(x1, x2) =
p + 2q(1− xi)
1− q2x1x2 .
To have a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that f1(x1, x2), f2(x1, x2) ≥ 1
since otherwise player 2 or player 3 would prefer to leave the game at s1 or s2,
respectively, which would give the respective player payoff 1 immediately. Vice
versa, if f1(x1, x2), f2(x1, x2) ≥ 1 then σ is a Nash equilibrium with expected
payoff
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Figure 8. Reducing SqrtSum to StatNE.
f (x1, x2) :=
p + qx1 p
1− q2x1x2
for player 1. Hence, to determine the maximum payoff for player 1 in a stationary
Nash equilibrium where player 0 receives payoff ≥ 0, we have to maximise
f (x1, x2) under the constraints f1(x1, x2), f2(x1, x2) ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ x1, x2 ≤ 1. We
claim that the maximum is reached only if x1 = x2. If e.g. x1 > x2, then we can
achieve a higher payoff for player 1 by setting x′2 := x1, and the constraints are
still satisfied:
p + 2q(1− x′2)
1− q2x1x′2
=
p + 2q(1− x1)
1− q2x21
≥ p + 2q(1− x1)
1− q2x1x2 ≥ 1 .
Hence, it suffices to maximise f (x, x) subject to f1(x, x) ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
which is equivalent to maximising f (x, x) subject to (1 − p)x2 − 2x + 1 ≥ 0
and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. and The roots of the quadratic function are (1±√p)/(1− p),
but (1 +
√
p)/(1− p) > 1 for p > 0. Therefore, any solution x must satisfy
x ≤ x0 := (1−√p)/(1− p). Since 0 ≤ x0 ≤ 1 for 0 < p < 1 and f (x, x) is
strictly increasing on [0, 1], the optimal solution is x0, and the maximal payoff for
player 1 in a stationary Nash equilibrium of (G(p), s1) where player 0 receives
payoff ≥ 0 equals indeed
f (x0, x0) =
p + qx0 p
1− q2x20
=
p
1− qx0 =
p
1− (1− p)x0 =
p
1− (1−√p) =
√
p . 
Proof (of Theorem 11). Given an instance (d1, . . . , dn, k) of SqrtSum, where w.l.o.g.
n > 0, di > 0 for each i = 1, . . . , n, and d := ∑ni=1 di, we construct a turn-based
8-player terminal-reward game (G, s) such that (G, s) has a stationary Nash
equilibrium with payoff ≥ (0, kd(n+1) , 0, . . . , 0) if and only if ∑ni=1
√
di ≥ k. Define
pi := di/d2 for i = 1, . . . , n. For the reduction, we use n copies of the game G(p),
where in the ith copy we set p to pi; in each copy, we set the rewards to player 6
and player 7 at all terminal states to 1 and 0, respectively. The complete game G
is depicted in Figure 8; it can obviously be constructed in polynomial time.
We claim that in any (stationary) Nash equilibrium of (G, sn) where player 0
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receives payoff ≥ 0 the probability of reaching the game G(pi) equals 1/(n + 1)
for all i = 1, . . . , n. First note that in any such equilibrium the state s0 must
be reached with positive probability since otherwise player 7 would prefer to
leave the game at one of the states ri, giving player 0 payoff < 0. Now let σ
be a stationary Nash equilibrium of (G, sn) where player 0 receives payoff ≥ 0,
and set qi := σ0(si−1 | ti). By induction on i, we prove that qi = i/(i + 1). For
i = 1, this is true because if qi > 12 then player 6 would prefer to leave the game
at s1, and if qi < 12 then player 7 would prefer to leave the game at r1. Now let
i > 1 and assume that qj = j/(j + 1) for all j < i. A simple calculation reveals
that the expected payoffs for player 6 and player 7 from si−1 equal (i − 1)/i
and (n + 1)/i, respectively. Hence, the expected payoff for player 6 from state ti
equals
1− qi + qi · i− 1i = 1−
qi
i
=
i + 1− qi · i+1i
i + 1
.
If qi > i/(i + 1), then this number would be strictly smaller than i/(i + 1), and
player 6 would be better off by leaving the game at si. On the other hand, the
expected payoff for player 7 from state ti equals qi(n + 1)/i. If qi < i/(i + 1),
then this number would be strictly smaller than (n + 1)/(i + 1), and player 7
would prefer to leave the game at ri. In both cases, we have a contradiction to
σ being a Nash equilibrium. Hence, qi = i/(i + 1) for all i = 1, . . . , n, and the
probability of reaching the game G(pi) from sn equals
(1− qi)
n
∏
j=i+1
qi = (1− ii + 1 )
n
∏
j=i+1
j
j + 1
=
1
i + 1
· i + 1
n + 1
=
1
n + 1
.
It remains to be shown that (G, sn) has a stationary Nash equilibrium with payoff
≥ (0, kd(n+1) , 0, . . . , 0) if and only if ∑ni=1
√
di ≥ k. By Lemma 12, the maximal
payoff player 1 receives in a stationary Nash equilibrium of (G(pi), s1) where
player 0 receives payoff at least 0 equals
√
pi =
√
di/d. Hence, the maximal
payoff player 1 receives in a stationary Nash equilibrium of (G, sn) where player 0
receives payoff at least 0 equals
n
∑
i=1
1
n + 1
·
√
di
d
=
1
d(n + 1)
·
n
∑
i=1
√
di .
We conclude that (G, sn) has a stationary Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥
(0, kd(n+1) , 0, . . . , 0) if and only if ∑
n
i=1
√
di ≥ k. 
Again, we can combine our reduction with the game from Example 1 to prove
a stronger result for games that are not turn-based.
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Corollary 13. Deciding whether a concurrent 8-player terminal reward game
has a stationary Nash equilibrium is hard for SqrtSum.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Corollary 7, but we use the game G1
from Example 1 instead of the game G2, and player 0 receives reward 0 in each
state of G1 and reward −1 in the new terminal state. Since G1 is a terminal-
reward game, the resulting game G ′ is a terminal-reward game if the original
game G is a terminal-reward game. 
Remark 14. The positive results of Sections 4 and 5 can easily be extended to
equilibria in pure or randomised strategies with a memory of a fixed size k ∈N:
a nondeterministic algorithm can guess a memory structure M of size k and
then look for a positional, respectively stationary, equilibrium in the product of
the original game G with the memory M. Hence, for any fixed k ∈ N, we can
decide in Pspace (NP) the existence of a randomised (pure) equilibrium of size k
with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y. Moreover, these results extend to stochastic games
(by appealing to results on MDPs with limit-average objectives; see e.g. [22]).
6 Pure Strategies
In this section, we show that PureNE is decidable and, in fact, NP-complete. Let
G be a concurrent game, s ∈ S and i ∈ Π. We define
pvalGi (s) = infσ supτ E
σ−i ,τ
s (φi),
where σ ranges over all pure strategy profiles of G and τ ranges over all strategies
of player i. Intuitively, pvalGi (s) is the lowest payoff that the coalition Π \ {i} can
inflict on player i by playing a pure strategy.
By a reduction to a turn-based two-player zero-sum game, we can show that
there is a positional strategy profile that attains this value.
Proposition 15. Let G be a concurrent game, and i ∈ Π. There exists a posi-
tional strategy profile σ∗ such that Eσ
∗
−i ,τ
s (φi) ≤ pvalGi (s) for all states s and all
strategies τ of player i.
Proof. We define a turn-based two-player zero-sum game G ′ with players 0 and 1
as follows: The set of states of G ′ is S′ = S ∪ (S× ΓΠ). At a state s ∈ S, player 1
chooses an action profile a that is legal at s, which leads the game to the state
(s, a). At a state of the form (s, a), player 0 chooses an action b ∈ Γi(s), which
leads the game to the state δ(s, (a−i, b)). Finally, player 0’s reward at a state
s ∈ S or (s, a) ∈ S × ΓΠ is r′(s) = r′(s, a) = ri(s) (and player 1’s reward is
the opposite). By [10], there exists a function ν : S′ → Q (the value function)
and positional strategies σ∗ and τ∗ for player 1 and player 0, respectively, such
that Eτ,σ
∗
s (φ
′
0) ≤ ν(s) for all s ∈ S′ and all strategies τ of player 0 in G ′, and
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Eτ
∗ ,σ
s (φ
′
0) ≥ ν(s) for all s ∈ S′ and all strategies σ of player 1 in G ′. We can
translate player 1’s strategy σ∗ into a positional strategy profile σ∗ of G such that
E
σ∗−i ,τ
s (φi) ≤ ν(s) for all states s ∈ S and all strategies τ of player i in G. Hence,
pvalGi (s) ≤ supτ E
σ∗−i ,τ
s (φi) ≤ ν(s) for all s ∈ S. We claim that pvalGi (s) ≥ ν(s)
for all s ∈ S, which implies that pvalGi (s) = ν(s) for all s ∈ S and that σ∗ is the
strategy profile we are looking for. Otherwise, there would exist a pure strategy
profile σ in G such that supτ Eσ−i ,τs (φi) < ν(s) for some s ∈ S. But we could
translate such a strategy profile σ into a pure strategy σ of player 1 in G ′ such
that Eτ
∗,σ
s (φ
′
0) < ν(s), a contradiction to the optimality of τ
∗. 
Given a payoff vector z ∈ (R∪ {±∞})Π , we define a directed graph G(z) =
(V, E) (with self-loops) as follows: V = S, and there is an edge from s to t if
and only if there is an action profile a with δ(s, a) = t such that (1) a is legal
at s and (2) pvalGi (δ(s, (a−i, b))) ≤ zi for each player i and each action b ∈ Γi(s).
Following [3], we call any a that fulfils (1) and (2) z-secure at s.
Lemma 16. Let z ∈ (R ∪ {±∞})Π. If there exists an infinite path π in G(z)
from s0 with zi ≤ φi(π) for each player i, then (G, s0) has a pure Nash equilibrium
with payoff φi(π) for player i.
Proof. Let π = s0s1 . . . be an infinite path in G(z) from s0 with zi ≤ φi(π) for each
player i. We define a pure strategy profile σ as follows: For histories of the form
x = s0a0s1 . . . sk−1ak−1sk, we set σ(x) to an action profile a with δ(sk, a) = sk+1
that is z-secure at sk. For all other histories x = t0a0t1 . . . tk−1ak−1tk, consider the
least j such that sj+1 ̸= tj+1. If aj differs from a z-secure action profile a at sj
in precisely one entry i, we set σ(x) = σ∗(tk), where σ∗ is a (fixed) positional
strategy profile such that E
σ∗−i ,τ
s (φi) ≤ pvalGi (s) for all s ∈ S (which is guaranteed
to exist by Proposition 15); otherwise, σ(x) can be chosen arbitrarily. It is easy to
see that σ is a Nash equilibrium with induced play π. 
Lemma 17. Let σ be a pure Nash equilibrium of (G, s0) with payoff z. Then there
exists an infinite path π in G(z) from s0 with φi(π) = zi for each player i.
Proof. Let s0a0s1a1 . . . be the play induced by σ. We claim that π := s0s1 . . . is
a path in G(z). Otherwise, consider the least k such that (sk, sk+1) is not an
edge in G(z). Hence, there exists no z-secure action profile at s := sk. Since
ak is certainly legal at s, there exists a player i and an action b ∈ Γi(s) such that
pvalGi (δ(s, (a−i, b))) > zi. But then player i can improve her payoff by switching
to a strategy that mimics σi until s is reached, then plays action b, and after that
mimics a strategy that ensures payoff > zi against any pure strategy profile. This
contradicts the assumption that σ is a Nash equilibrium. 
Using Lemmas 16 and 17, we can reduce the task of finding a pure Nash
equilibrium to the task of finding a path in a multi-weighted graph whose
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limit-average weight vector falls between two thresholds. The latter problem can
be solved in polynomial time by solving a linear programme with one variable
for each pair of a weight function and an edge in the graph, as we prove in the
appendix.
Theorem 18. Given a finite directed graph G = (V, E) with weight functions
r0, . . . , rk−1 : V → Q, v0 ∈ V, and x, y ∈ (Q ∪ {±∞})k, we can decide in
polynomial time whether there exists an infinite path π = v0v1 . . . in G with
xi ≤ lim infn→∞ 1n ∑n−1j=0 ri(vj) ≤ yi for all i = 0, . . . , k− 1.
We can now describe a nondeterministic algorithm to decide the existence
of a pure Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y in polynomial time.
The algorithm starts by guessing, for each player i, a positional strategy profile σi
of G and computes pi(s) := supτ E
σi−i ,τ
s (φi) for each s ∈ S; these numbers can
be computed in polynomial time using the algorithm given by Karp [18]. The
algorithm then guesses a vector z ∈ (R ∪ {±∞})Π by setting zi either to xi or
to pi(s) for some s ∈ S with xi ≤ pi(s), and constructs the graph G′(z), which is
defined as G(z) but with pi(s) substituted for pval
G
i (s). Finally, the algorithm
determines (in polynomial time) whether there exists an infinite path π in G(z)
from s0 with zi ≤ φi(π) ≤ yi for all i ∈ Π. If such a path exists, the algorithm
accepts; otherwise it rejects.
Theorem 19. PureNE is in NP.
Proof. We claim that the algorithm described above is correct, i.e. sound and
complete. To prove soundness, assume that the algorithm accepts its input.
Hence, there exists an infinite path π in G′(z) from s0 with zi ≤ φi(π) ≤ yi.
Since pvalGi (s) ≤ pi(s) for all i ∈ Π and s ∈ S, the graph G′(z) is a subgraph
of G(z). Hence, π is also an infinite path in G(z). By Lemma 16, we can conclude
that (G, s0) has a pure Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ z ≥ x and ≤ y.
To prove that the algorithm is complete, let σ be a pure Nash equilibrium of
(G, s0) with payoff z, where x ≤ z ≤ y. By Proposition 15, the algorithm
can guess positional strategy profiles σi such that pi(s) = pval
G
i (s) for all
s ∈ S. If the algorithm additionally guesses the payoff vector z′ defined by
z′i = max{xi, pvalGi (s) : s ∈ S, pvalGi (s) ≤ zi} for all i ∈ Π, then the graph G(z)
coincides with the graph G(z′) (and thus with G′(z′)). By Lemma 17, there exists
an infinite path π in G(z) from s0 such that z′i ≤ zi = φi(π) ≤ yi for all i ∈ Π.
Hence, the algorithm accepts. 
The following theorem shows that PureNE is NP-hard. In fact, NP-hardness
holds even for turn-based games with rewards 0 and 1.
Theorem 20. PureNE is NP-hard, even for turn-based games with rewards
0 and 1.
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Proof. Again, we reduce from SAT. Given a Boolean formula ϕ = C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Cm
in conjunctive normal form over propositional variables X1, . . . , Xn, where w.l.o.g.
m ≥ 1 and each clause is nonempty, let G be the turn-based game described in
the proof of Theorem 9 and depicted in Figure 6. We claim that the following
statements are equivalent:
1. ϕ is satisfiable.
2. (G, C1) has a positional Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ 1 for player 0.
3. (G, C1) has a pure Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ 1 for player 0.
Since the implication (1.⇒ 2.) was already proved in the proof of Theorem 9
and the implication (2.⇒ 3.) is trivial, we only need to prove that 3. implies 1.
Hence, assume that (G, C1) has a pure Nash equilibrium σ with payoff ≥ 1 for
player 0. Since player 0 receives payoff ≥ 1, the terminal state ⊥ is not reached
in the induced play π. Consider the variable assignment α that maps Xi to true
if and only if player i receives payoff < 1 from π; we claim that α satisfies the
formula. Consider any clause C. Set T = {(C, Xi), (C,¬Xi) : i = 1, . . . , n}, and
denote by 1s the characteristic function of s ∈ T. We have
∑
s∈T
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n−1
∑
j=0
−1s(π(j)) ≤ lim infn→∞
1
n
n−1
∑
j=0
∑
s∈T
−1s(π(j)) = − 12m < 0 .
In particular, there exists a state s = (C, L) such that
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n−1
∑
j=0
−1s(π(j)) < 0 .
If L = Xi, then ri ≤ 1− 1s. Hence, φi(π) < 1, and α maps Xi to true, thereby
satisfying C. If L = ¬Xi, then player i must receive payoff 1, because otherwise
she could improve her payoff by playing from s to ⊥. Hence, α maps Xi to false
and satisfies C. 
It follows from Theorems 19 and 20 that PureNE is NP-complete. By combin-
ing our reduction with a game that has no pure Nash equilibrium, we can prove
the following stronger result for non-turn-based games.
Corollary 21. Deciding the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in a concurrent
limit-average game is NP-complete, even for games with rewards 0 and 1.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Corollary 10. 
Note that Theorem 20 and Corollary 21 do not apply to terminal-reward
games. In fact, PureNE is decidable in P for these games, which follows from two
facts about terminal-reward games: (1) the numbers pvalGi (s) can be computed
in polynomial time (using a reduction to a turn-based two-player zero-sum game
and applying a result of Washburn [31]), and (2) the only possible vectors that
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can emerge as the payoff of a pure strategy profile are the zero vector and the
reward vectors at terminal states.
Theorem 22. PureNE is in P for terminal-reward games.
7 Randomised Strategies
In this section, we show that the problem NE is undecidable and, in fact, not
recursively enumerable for turn-based terminal-reward games. The proof pro-
ceeds by a reduction from an undecidable problem about two-counter machines.
Such a machine is of the form M = (Q, q0,∆), where
– Q is a finite set of states,
– q0 ∈ Q is the initial state,
– ∆ ⊆ Q× Γ×Q is a set of transitions.
The set Γ specifies which instructions M may perform on its counters. For our
purposes, the instruction set Γ := {inc(j), dec(j), zero(j) : j = 1, 2} suffices: a
counter can be incremented, decremented, or tested for zero. For q ∈ Q we
write q∆ for the set of all (γ, q′) ∈ Γ×Q such that (q,γ, q′) ∈ ∆. The machine M
is deterministic if for each q ∈ Q either (1) q∆ = ∅, (2) q∆ = {(inc(j), q′)} for
some j ∈ {1, 2} and q′ ∈ Q, or (3) q∆ = {(zero(j), q1), (dec(j), q2)} for some
j ∈ {1, 2} and q1, q2 ∈ Q.
A configuration of M is a triple C = (q, i1, i2) ∈ Q×N×N, where q denotes
the current state and ij denotes the current value of counter j. A configura-
tion C′ = (q′, i′1, i
′
2) is a successor of configuration C = (q, i1, i2), denoted by
C ⊢ C′, if there exists a “matching” transition (q,γ, q′) ∈ ∆. For example,
(q, i1, i2) ⊢ (q′, i1 + 1, i2) if and only if (q, inc(1), q′) ∈ ∆. The instruction
zero(j) performs a zero test: (q, i1, i2) ⊢ (q′, i1, i2) if and only if i1 = 0 and
(q, zero(1), q′) ∈ ∆, or i2 = 0 and (q, zero(2), q′) ∈ ∆.
A partial computation of M is a sequence ρ = ρ(0)ρ(1) . . . of configurations
such that ρ(0) ⊢ ρ(1) ⊢ · · · and ρ(0) = (q0, 0, 0) (the initial configuration).
A partial computation of M is a computation of M if it is infinite or it ends
in a configuration C for which there is no C′ with C ⊢ C′. Note that each
deterministic two-counter machine has a unique computation.
The halting problem is to decide, given a machine M, whether the computation
of M is finite. It is well-known that deterministic two-counter machines are
Turing powerful, which makes the halting problem and its dual, the non-halting
problem, undecidable, even when restricted to deterministic two-counter ma-
chines. In fact, the non-halting problem for deterministic two-counter machines
is not recursively enumerable.
To prove the undecidability of NE, we employ a reduction from the non-
halting problem for deterministic two-counter machines. More precisely, we
show how to compute from such a machine M a game (G, s0) such that the
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computation of M is infinite if and only if there exists a Nash equilibrium of
(G, s0) where player 0 receives expected payoff ≥ 0. Without loss of generality,
we assume that in M there is no zero test that is followed by another zero test:
if (q, zero(j), q′) ∈ ∆, then |q′∆| ≤ 1.
The game G is played by players 0, 1 and 12 other players Atj, Btj , Dt and Ej,
indexed by j ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ {0, 1}. Intuitively, player 0 and player 1 build
up the computation of M: player 0 updates the counters, and player 1 chooses
transitions. Players Atj and B
t
j make sure that player 0 updates the counters
correctly: players A0j and A
1
j ensure that, in each step, the value of counter j
is not too high, and players B0j and B
1
j ensure that, in each step, the value of
counter j is not too low. More precisely, A0j and B
0
j monitor the even steps of the
computation, while A1j and B
1
j monitor the odd steps. Finally, players D
t and Ej
ensure that player 0 uses a randomised strategy of a restricted form.
Let Γ′ := Γ ∪ {init}. For each q ∈ Q, each γ ∈ Γ′, each j ∈ {1, 2} and each
t ∈ {0, 1}, the game G contains the gadgets Stγ,q, Itq and Ctγ,j, which are depicted
in Figure 9. The initial state of G is s0 := s0init,q0 . Note that in the gadget Stγ,q,
each of the players Atj, B
t
j , D
t and Ej may unilaterally decide to quit the game,
which gives the respective player a payoff of 1 or 2, but payoff −1 to player 0.
It will turn out that player 1 will play a pure strategy in any Nash equilibrium
of (G, s0) where player 0 receives expected payoff 0, except possibly for histories
that are not consistent with the equilibrium. Moreover, player 0 has to play
a uniform distribution inside Stγ,q. Formally, we say that a strategy profile σ
of G is safe if 1. σ0(xs) assigns probability 12 to both outgoing transitions for all
histories xs consistent with σ and ending in a state s ∈ Stγ,q controlled by player 0,
and 2. σ1(xs) is degenerate for all histories xs consistent with σ and ending in a
state s controlled by player 1.
For each safe strategy profile σ where player 0 receives expected payoff 0,
let x0s0 ≺ x1s1 ≺ x2s2 ≺ . . . (xi ∈ S∗, si ∈ S, x0 = ε) be the unique sequence
consisting of all histories xs of (G, s0) consistent with σ that end in a state s
of the form s = stγ,q. This sequence is infinite because σ is safe and player 0
receives expected payoff 0. Additionally, let q0, q1, . . . be the corresponding
sequence of states and γ0,γ1, . . . be the corresponding sequence of instructions,
i.e. sn = s0γn ,qn or sn = s
1
γn ,qn for all n ∈ N. For each j ∈ {1, 2} and n ∈ N,
we define two conditional expectations as follows:
anj := E
σ
s0(φAn mod 2j
| xnsn · Sω) ;
bnj := E
σ
s0(φBn mod 2j
| xnsn · Sω) .
Note that at every terminal state of the counter gadgets Ctγ,j and C
1−t
γ,j the rewards
of player Atj and player B
t
j sum up to 4. For each j, the conditional probability
that, given the history xnsn, we reach such a state is ∑k∈N 12k · 14 = 12 . Hence,
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Stγ,q:
stγ,qAt1
0 : −1
At1 : 1
At2
0 : −1
At2 : 1
Bt1
0 : −1
Bt1 : 1
Bt2
0 : −1
Bt2 : 1
Dt
0 : −1
Dt : 2
D1−t
0 : −1
D1−t : 1
0
E1 E2
0
Itq
0 : −1
E1 : 1
0 : −1
E2 : 1
Ctγ,1
Ctγ,2
Itq for q∆ = {(inc(j), q′)}:
1
S1−tinc(j),q′
Itq for q∆ = {(zero(j), q1), (dec(j), q2)}:
1 S1−tzero(j),q1
S1−tdec(j),q2
Itq for q∆ = ∅:
0 : − 1
Ctγ,j for γ /∈ {init, inc(j), dec(j), zero(j)}:
0

Atj : 2
A1−tj : 2
Btj : 2
B1−tj : 2
Dt : 3
Ej : 2

Atj : 3
Btj : 1
B1−tj : 4
Dt : 3
Ej : 2
Ctγ,j for γ = inc(j):
0

Atj : 2
A1−tj : 4
Btj : 2
Dt : 3
Ej : 2

Atj : 3
Btj : 1
B1−tj : 4
Dt : 3
Ej : 2
Ctγ,j for γ = dec(j):
0

Atj : 2
A1−tj : 1
Btj : 2
B1−tj : 3
Dt : 3
Ej : 2

Atj : 3
Btj : 1
B1−tj : 4
Dt : 3
Ej : 2
Ctγ,j for γ ∈ {init, zero(j)}:
0

1 : 1
Atj : 2
A1−tj : 2
Btj : 2
B1−tj : 2
Dt : 3
Ej : 2
Figure 9. Simulating a two-counter machine.
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anj + b
n
j = 2 for all n ∈N. We say that σ is stable if anj = 1 or, equivalently, bnj = 1
for each j ∈ {1, 2} and for all n ∈N.
Finally, for each j ∈ {1, 2} and n ∈ N, we define a number cnj ∈ [0, 1] as
follows: After the history xnsn, with probability 14 the play proceeds to the state
controlled by player 0 in the counter gadget Cn mod 2γn ,j . The number c
n
j is defined
as the probability that player 0 plays to the neighbouring grey state. Note that,
by the construction of G, it holds that cnj = 1 if γn = zero(j) or γn = init. In
particular, c01 = c
0
2 = 1.
Lemma 23. Let σ be a safe strategy profile with expected payoff 0 for player 0.
Then σ is stable if and only if
cn+1j =

1
2 · cnj if γn+1 = inc(j),
2 · cnj if γn+1 = dec(j),
cnj = 1 if γn+1 = zero(j),
cnj otherwise.
(1)
for each j ∈ {1, 2} and for all n ∈N.
To prove the lemma, consider a safe strategy profile σ of G with expected
payoff 0 for player 0. For each j ∈ {1, 2} and n ∈ N, we define yet another
conditional expectation
pnj := E
σ
s0(φAn mod 2j
| xnsn · Sω \ xn+2sn+2 · Sω) .
The following claim relates the numbers anj and p
n
j .
Claim. Let j ∈ {1, 2}. Then anj = 1 for all n ∈ N if and only if pnj = 34 for all
n ∈N.
Proof. (⇒) Assume that anj = 1 for all n ∈ N. We have anj = pnj + 14 · an+2j and
therefore 1 = pnj +
1
4 for all n ∈N. Hence, pnj = 34 for all n ∈N.
(⇐) Assume that pnj = 34 for all n ∈N. Since anj = pnj + 14 · an+2j for all n ∈N,
the numbers anj have to satisfy the following recurrence: a
n+2
j = 4a
n
j − 3. Since
all the numbers anj are bounded by the minimum and maximum reward for
player An mod 2j , we have 0 ≤ anj ≤ 4 for all n ∈N. It is easy to see that the only
values for a0j and a
1
j such that 0 ≤ anj ≤ 4 for all n ∈N are a0j = a1j = 1. But this
implies that anj = 1 for all n ∈N. 
Proof (of Lemma 23). By the previous claim, it suffices to show that pnj =
3
4 if and
only if (1) holds. Let j ∈ {1, 2}, n ∈N and t = n mod 2. The number pnj can be
expressed as a weighted average of the expected payoff for player Atj inside C
t
γn ,j
and the expected payoff for player Atj inside C
1−t
γn+1,j
. The first payoff does not
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depend on γn, but the second depends on γn+1. Let us consider the case that
γn+1 = inc(j). In this case, pnj equals
1
4 ·
(
cnj · 2+ (1− cnj ) · 3
)
+ 18 · cn+1j · 4 = 34 − 14 · cnj + 12 · cn+1j .
Obviously, this sum equals 34 if and only if c
n+1
j =
1
2 · cnj . For any other value
of γn+1, the argumentation is similar. 
The next lemma states that every Nash equilibrium with expected payoff 0
for player 0 is, in fact, safe.
Lemma 24. Let σ be a Nash equilibrium of (G, s0) with expected payoff 0 for
player 0. Then σ is safe.
Proof. We start by proving that player 0 plays a uniform distribution inside Stγ,q.
We prove this separately for histories that end in a white state and histories that
end in a grey state.
Let xs be a history consistent with σ and ending in a white state s ∈ Stγ,q
controlled by player 0. Since the players E1 and E2 can ensure payoff 1 by
quitting the game, player 0 has to play to Ctγ,1 and C
t
γ,2 with probability
1
2 each.
Otherwise, σ would not be a Nash equilibrium.
Now let xs be a history consistent with σ and ending in a grey state s ∈ Stγ,q
controlled by player 0. In the following, let t = 0; the proof for t = 1 is analogous.
Denote by p the probability that player 0 plays to t ∈ Itq after the history xs. For
i ∈ {0, 1}, let
di = Eσs0(φDi | xst · Sω).
By the definition of the game, we have d0 ≥ 1 and d1 ≥ 2. On the other hand,
since at every terminal state the sum of the rewards for players D0 and D1 is at
most 3, we have d0 + d1 ≤ 3. Hence, d0 = 1 and d1 = 2. Consider the expected
payoffs for players D0 and D1 after the history xs:
Eσs0(φD0 | xs · Sω) = (1− p) · 3+ p · d0 = 3− 2p;
Eσs0(φD1 | xs · Sω) = p · d1 = 2p .
Since σ is a Nash equilibrium, these numbers are bounded from below by 2
and 1, respectively (otherwise, it would be better for player D0 or D1 to quit the
game). Hence, p = 12 .
To prove that σ is safe, it remains to be shown that player 1 plays a de-
generate distribution for all histories xs consistent with σ and ending in a
state s ∈ Itq. Towards a contradiction, assume that xs is such a history and
that σ1(xs) assigns probability > 0 to two distinct successor states. Hence,
q∆ = {(zero(j), q1), (dec(j), q2)} for some j ∈ {1, 2} and q1, q2 ∈ Q. By our
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assumption that there are no consecutive zero tests and since player 0 receives
expected payoff 0,
Eσs0(φ1 | xs · s1−tzero(j),q1 · S
ω) ≥ 14 ,
but
Eσs0(φ1 | xs · s1−tdec(j),q2 · S
ω) ≤ 16 .
Hence, player 1 could improve her payoff by playing to s1−tzero(j),q1 with probabil-
ity 1, a contradiction to σ being a Nash equilibrium. 
Finally, we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 25. NE is not recursively enumerable, even for turn-based 14-player
terminal-reward games.
Proof. We claim that the function mapping a deterministic two-counter ma-
chine M to the 14-player game (G, s0) as described above realises a many-one
reduction from the non-halting problem to NE. Clearly, G can be computed
from M. We prove that the computation of M is infinite if and only if (G, s0)
has a Nash equilibrium in which player 0 receives expected payoff (at least) 0.
(⇒) Assume that the computation ρ = ρ(0)ρ(1) . . . of M is infinite. Player 0’s
equilibrium strategy σ0 can be described as follows: For a history that ends at
the unique state controlled by player 0 in the gadget Ctγ,j after visiting a state of
the form stγ′ ,q or s
1−t
γ′ ,q exactly n > 0 times, player 0 plays to the grey successor
state with probability 2−i, where i is the value of counter j in configuration
ρ(n− 1). Moreover, for a history that ends at a state controlled by player 0 in
the gadget Stγ,q, player 0 plays to both successors with probability
1
2 each.
The only place where player 1 has a choice is the sole state in the gadget Itq for
q∆ = {(zero(j), q1), (dec(j), q2)}. If the play arrives at such a state after visiting a
state of the form stγ,q′ or s
1−t
γ,q′ exactly n > 0 times, then player 1’s pure strategy σ1
prescribes to play to S1−tzero(j),q1 if the value of counter j in configuration ρ(n− 1)
is zero and to S1−tdec(j),q2 if the value of counter j in configuration ρ(n − 1) is
non-zero.
Any other player’s pure strategy is defined as follows: After a history ending
in Stγ,q, the strategy prescribes to quit the game if and only if the history is
not compatible with ρ (i.e. the corresponding sequence of instructions does not
match ρ).
Note that the resulting strategy profile σ is safe. Moreover, since player 0 and
player 1 follow the computation of M, a terminal state inside one of the counter
gadgets Ctγ,j is reached with probability 1. Since player 0 receives reward 0 at any
such terminal state, player 0’s expected payoff equals 0. Finally, by the definition
of σ, for each j ∈ {1, 2} and for all n ∈N, if i and i′ are the values of counter j
27
in configuration ρ(n) and configuration ρ(n + 1), respectively, then cnj = 2
−i,
cn+1j = 2
−i′ , and γn+1 is the instruction corresponding to the counter update
from ρ(n) to ρ(n + 1). Hence, (1) holds, and we can conclude from Lemma 23
that σ is stable.
We claim that σ is, in fact, a Nash equilibrium of (G, s0): It is obvious that
player 0 cannot improve her payoff. If player 1 deviates, then with positive
probability we reach a history that is not compatible with ρ; hence, player A01
or A11 will quit the game, which ensures that player 1 will receive payoff 0 after
this history. Since σ is stable, none of the players Atj or B
t
j can improve her
payoff. Finally, the expected payoffs of player Dt and player D1−t from stγ,q equal
2 and 1, respectively, which is the same as they would get if they quit the game.
The reasoning for players E1 and E2 is analogous.
(⇐) Assume that σ is a Nash equilibrium of (G, s0) with expected payoff ≥ 0
for player 0. Since 0 is the maximum reward for player 0, this means that the
expected payoff of σ for player 0 equals 0. From Lemma 24, we can conclude
that σ is safe. To apply Lemma 23 and obtain (1), it remains to be shown that
σ is stable. In order to derive a contradiction, assume that there exists j ∈ {1, 2}
and n ∈ N such that either anj < 1 or anj > 1, i.e. bnj < 1. In the first case,
player An mod 2j could improve her payoff by quitting the game after history xnsn,
while in the second case, player Bn mod 2j could improve her payoff by quitting
the game, again a contradiction to σ being a Nash equilibrium.
From (1) and the fact that c0j = 1, it follows that each c
n
j is of the form c
n
j = 2
−i
with i ∈ N. We denote by inj the unique number i such that cnj = 2−i and set
ρ(n) = (qn, in1 , i
n
2 ) for each n ∈ N. We claim that ρ := ρ(0)ρ(1) . . . is in fact the
computation of M. In particular, this computation is infinite. It suffices to verify
the following two properties:
– ρ(0) = (q0, 0, 0).
– ρ(n) ⊢ ρ(n + 1) for all n ∈N.
The first property is immediate. To prove the second property, let ρ(n) =
(q, i1, i2) and ρ(n + 1) = (q′, i′1, i
′
2). Hence, sn lies inside S
t
γ,q, and sn+1 lies
inside S1−tγ′ ,q′ for suitable γ,γ
′ and t = n mod 2. We only prove the claim for
q∆ = {(zero(1), q1), (dec(1), q2)}; the other cases are similar. Note that, by
the construction of the gadget Itq, it must be the case that either q′ = q1 and
γ′ = zero(1), or q′ = q2 and γ′ = dec(1). By (1), if γ′ = zero(1), then i′1 = i1 = 0
and i′2 = i2, and if γ′ = dec(1), then i′1 = i1 − 1 and i′2 = i2. This implies
ρ(n) ⊢ ρ(n + 1): On the one hand, if i1 = 0, then i′1 ̸= i1 − 1, which implies
γ′ ̸= dec(1) and thus γ′ = zero(1), q′ = q1 and i′1 = i1 = 0. On the other hand,
if i1 > 0, then γ′ ̸= zero(1) and thus γ′ = dec(1), q′ = q2 and i′1 = i1 − 1. 
For games that are not turn-based, we can show the stronger theorem that
the set of all games that have a Nash equilibrium is not recursively enumerable.
28
Corollary 26. The set of all initialised concurrent 14-player terminal-reward
games that have a Nash equilibrium is not recursively enumerable.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Corollary 10, but we use the game G1
from Example 1 instead of the game G2, and we set the reward for player 0 in
each state of G1 to 0. 
8 Conclusion
We have analysed the complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with
limit-average objectives. In particular, we have shown that randomisation in
strategies leads to undecidability, while restricting to pure strategies retains
decidability. This is in contrast to stochastic games, where pure strategies lead to
undecidability [27]. While we have provided matching and lower bounds in most
cases, there remain some problems where we do not know the exact complexity.
Apart from StatNE, these include the problem PureNE when restricted to a
bounded number of players.
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Appendix
This appendix is devoted to the proof of Theorem 18, which is restated here.
Theorem 18. Given a finite directed graph G = (V, E) with weight functions
r0, . . . , rk−1 : V → Q, v0 ∈ V, and x, y ∈ (Q ∪ {±∞})k, we can decide in
polynomial time whether there exists an infinite path π = v0v1 . . . in G with
xi ≤ lim infn→∞ 1n ∑n−1j=0 ri(vj) ≤ yi for all i = 0, . . . , k− 1.
In the following, let G = (V, E) be a finite directed graph with weight
functions r0, . . . , rk−1 : V → Q, and set [k] = {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}. Given a vertex
v ∈ V, we write In(v) and Out(v) for the set of all edges that end, respectively
start, in v. Moreover, given an edge e = (u, v) ∈ E we set ri(e) := ri(u). We
extend the weight functions ri to finite paths by setting ri(v1 . . . vn) = ∑nj=1 ri(vj).
If π = π(0)π(1) . . . is an infinite path and n ∈ N, we write π  n for the finite
path π(0) . . .π(n− 1), and we set φi(π) := lim infn→∞ ri(π  n)/n, i.e. φi(π) is
precisely the limit-average weight of the path π w.r.t. the weight function ri.
Finally, φ(π) denotes the vector (φi(π))i∈[k]. Now consider the following linear
constraints over the variables fi,e, where i ∈ [k] and e ∈ E:
(1) fi,e ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [k] and e ∈ E;
(2) ∑e∈E fi,e = 1 for all i ∈ [k];
(3) ∑e∈In(v) fi,e = ∑e∈Out(v) fi,e for all i ∈ [k] and v ∈ V;
(4) xi ≤ ∑e∈E fi,e · ri(e) ≤ yi for all i ∈ [k];
(5) ∑e∈E fi,e · ri(e) ≤ ∑e∈E f j,e · ri(e) for all i, j ∈ [k].
Lemma 27. If there exists an infinite path π in G such that x ≤ φ(π) ≤ y, then
there exists a solution to (1)–(5).
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Proof. Let π = π(0)π(1) . . . be an infinite path in G such that x ≤ φ(π) ≤ y.
Given n ∈ N and e ∈ E, define κ(n, e) := |{j < n : (π(j),π(j + 1)) = e}|.
Moreover, for n > 0, set λ(n, e) = κ(n, e)/n. Note that 0 ≤ λ(n, e) ≤ 1 for all
e ∈ E and n ∈N. In order to define the numbers fi,e, let us now fix i ∈ [k]. Since
φi(π) = lim infn→∞ ri(π  n)/n, there exist natural numbers 0 < ki0 < ki1 < · · ·
such that φi(π) = limn→∞ ri(π  kin)/kin. Now we define a sequence ϕi0, ϕi1, . . .
of vectors ϕin ∈ RE by setting ϕin(e) = λ(kin, e). Since this sequence is bounded,
by the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, there exists a converging subsequence
ψi0,ψ
i
1, . . . of this sequence. We set fi,e = limn→∞ ψ
i
n(e) for all e ∈ E.
We claim that the numbers ( fi,e)i∈[k],e∈E form a solution of (1)–(5). That
(1) holds is obvious from the definition. (2) follows from the fact that
∑e∈E λ(n, e) = 1 for all n ∈ N. To show that (3) holds, fix v ∈ V. Note
that we have ∑e∈In(v) κ(n, e) − ∑e∈Out(v) κ(n, e) ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and therefore
−1/n ≤ ∑e∈In(v) λ(n, e) − ∑e∈Out(v) λ(n, e) ≤ 1/n for all n ∈ N. Hence, the
terms ∑e∈In(v) ϕin(e) − ∑e∈Out(v) ϕin(e) converge to 0 when n goes to infinity.
Since ψi0,ψ
i
1, . . . is a subsequence of ϕ
i
0, ϕ
i
1, . . ., the same is true for the terms
∑e∈In(v) ψin(e)− ∑e∈Out(v) ψin(e). Since limn→∞ ψin(e) = fi,e exists for all e ∈ E,
this implies that ∑e∈In(v) fi,e − ∑e∈Out(v) fi,e = 0, which proves (3). In order to
prove (4) and (5), note that for all i, j ∈ [k] we have
φi(π) = lim infn→∞ ri(π  n)/n
≤ lim inf
n→∞ ri(π  k
j
n)/k
j
n
= lim inf
n→∞ ∑e∈E
λ(kjn, e) · ri(e)
= lim inf
n→∞ ∑e∈E
ϕ
j
n(e) · ri(e)
≤ lim
n→∞∑e∈E
ψ
j
n(e) · ri(e)
= ∑
e∈E
f j,e · ri(e) .
Moreover, if i = j, both inequalities are equalities since limn→∞ ri(π  kin)/kin
exists and equals φi(π). Hence, ∑e∈E fi,e · ri(e) = φi(π) ≤ ∑e∈E f j,e · ri(e) for
all i, j ∈ [k], which proves (5). Finally, (4) follows from the assumption that
x ≤ φ(π) ≤ y. 
Lemma 28. For all n ∈N,
(n− 2) ·
n−1
∑
j=1
j! < n!
Proof. By induction over n. 
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Lemma 29. Assume that G is strongly connected and that there exists a solution
to (1)–(5). Then there exists an infinite path π in G such that x ≤ φ(π) ≤ y.
Proof. Let G be strongly connected and assume that there exists a solution to
(1)–(5). It is well-known that if a given system of linear constraints has a solution,
then there exists one in rational numbers. Let ( fi,e)i∈[k],e∈E be such a solution,
where w.l.o.g. fi,e = ci,e/d with ci,e ∈N and d ∈N \ {0}. Finally, let z ∈ R[k] be
defined by zi = ∑e∈E fi,e · ri(e); by (4), x ≤ z ≤ y. We claim that there exists an
infinite path π in G with φ(π) = z.
For each i ∈ [k] consider the directed multigraph Gi, which is derived from G
by replacing a single edge (u, v) ∈ E by as many as ci,e edges from u to v.
By (3), we have ∑e∈In(v) ci,e = ∑e∈Out(v) ci,e for all v ∈ V. Hence, in Gi each
vertex has as many incoming edges as outgoing edges, which is a necessary and
sufficient condition for the existence of an Eulerian cycle in each of the connected
components of Gi. These cycles give rise to (disjoint, not necessarily simple)
cycles γi1, . . . ,γ
i
m in G, where m ≤ |V|.
Consider for each n ∈ N the cycle ζ in that starts by repeating the cycle γi1
n times, then takes the shortest path to the first vertex in the cycle γi2, repeats
this cycle n times, and so on, until, after repeating the cycle γim n times, taking
the shortest path back to γi1. Let M = maxv∈V rj(v) be the maximum weight
w.r.t. rj. Note that:
n · ∑
e∈E
ci,e · rj(e) ≤ rj(ζ in) ≤ n · ∑
e∈E
ci,e · rj(e) + |V|2 · M,
n · ∑
e∈E
ci,e ≤ |ζ in| ≤ n · ∑
e∈E
ci,e + |V|2.
Hence,
lim
n→∞
rj(ζ in)
|ζ in|
=
∑e∈E ci,e · rj(e)
∑e∈E ci,e
=
∑e∈E fi,e · rj(e)
∑e∈E fi,e
= ∑
e∈E
fi,e · rj(e) ≥ zj,
where the last inequality follows from (5). Moreover, if i = j, we have equality,
i.e. limn→∞ ri(ζ in)/|ζ in| = zi.
The desired infinite path π is the concatenation of finite paths πn, where
n = 1, 2 . . .. The path πn repeats the cycle ζn mod kn n! times and then takes the
shortest path to the first state on the cycle ζ(n+1) mod kn . We will now prove that
φ0(π) = z0; for all other weight functions, the proof is analogous. For all n ∈N,
we have:
nk
∑
j=1
j! r0
(
ζ
j mod k
j
)− nk|V|M ≤ r0(π1 · · ·πnk) ≤ nk∑
j=1
j! r0
(
ζ
j mod k
j
)
+ nk|V|M,
nk
∑
j=1
j!
∣∣ζ j mod kj ∣∣ ≤ |π1 · · ·πnk| ≤ nk∑
j=1
j!
∣∣ζ j mod kj ∣∣+ nk|V| .
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By Lemma 28, we have limn→∞ ∑nk−1j=1 j!/(nk)! = 0. Hence, and since
|ζ ij|, r0(ζ ij) ≤ j · c for some constant c, we have:
lim
n→∞
1
nk(nk)!
·
nk
∑
j=1
j! r0
(
ζ
j mod k
j
)
= lim
n→∞
1
nk
· r0(ζ0nk) =
m
∑
j=1
r0(γ0j ),
lim
n→∞
1
nk(nk)!
·
nk
∑
j=1
j!
∣∣ζ j mod kj ∣∣ = limn→∞ 1nk · |ζ0nk| = m∑j=1|γ0j | .
Hence,
lim
n→∞
r0(π1 · · ·πnk)
|π1 · · ·πnk| = limn→∞
r0(ζ0nk)
|ζ0nk|
= z0 .
We have thus found a subsequence of r0(π  n)/n that converges to z0, which
implies that φ0(π) = lim infn→∞ r0(π  n)/n ≤ z0. On the other hand, using the
fact that limn→∞ r0(ζ in)/|ζ in| ≥ z0 for all i ∈ [k], we can show that φ0(π) ≥ z0. 
Proof (of Theorem 18). Since the limit-average criterion is prefix-independent,
it suffices to decompose G into its strongly connected components (which can be
done in linear time) and check for each component C that is reachable from v0
whether exists an infinite path in C with x ≤ φ(π) ≤ y. By Lemmas 27 and 29,
such a path exists if and only if there exists a solution to the linear constraints
(1)–(5) derived from C. The existence of such a solution can be checked in
polynomial time (see [23]). 
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